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A widely ignored finding in social facilitation suggests that the mere pres-
ence of others increases the “spreading out” of one’s thoughts (Allport, 
1920). Here, we revisit this finding and expand upon it using a situated 
cognition perspective. 
Experiment 1 approached the spreading-out-of-thought effect using the 
same free-association task as Allport. Results replicated and extended pre-
vious findings. Compared to an alone condition, co-action and mere pres-
ence activated more associations, being that these associations are more 
context-related and more distant in the target word associative network. 
Assuming that this spreading-out-of-thought effect arises from an in-
creased salience of context-related processing, we tested this hypothesis 
using the Framed-Line Test paradigm in Experiment 2. Results showed that, 
as expected, co-action increased accuracy of estimation judgments that 
required incorporation of contextual information in processing.
These results support and extend Allport’s view that presence of others 
broadens our thoughts. We discuss this idea, suggesting that social con-
texts may prompt cognition to be more situated.
Recent situated cognition approaches within social psychology (Levine, Resnick, 
& Higgins, 1993; Semin & Cacioppo, 2009; Smith & Semin, 2007) have integrated 
the ideas developed in other fields (e.g., Arkin, 1998; Barsalou, 2003; Bredo, 1994; 
Glenberg, 1997; Greeno, 1989; Lave, 1988; Tulving, 1983) and suggested that cog-
nition cannot be separated from its context. One highly relevant context is the 
“social context.” Although it can be approached by different fields, the impact of 
the social context in thinking has its more direct relevance in the social facilitation 
phenomenon. In 1920, Allport demonstrated that we think differently when we 
are alone versus in the presence of others. Specifically, he observed, using a free-
association task, that the mere presence of a co-actor increases the tendency to re-
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spond based on the context, rather than on the stimulus itself. That is, in co-action, 
individuals increased the number of associations between the stimulus and its 
context, furnishing, for example, the associate “classroom” (instead of “educated”) 
to the stimulus probe “teacher.”
Allport suggested that this occurs because in the presence of others, there is 
“some sort of attitude... which takes him [the individual] ‘out of himself’ and di-
rects his ideas toward outside objects” (p. 167). In our view, this interpretation 
clearly reflects the current idea that cognition is modulated by the degree with 
which it integrates the context (e.g., Blair, 2002; Higgins & Stangor, 1988; Levine, 
Resnick & Higgins, 1993; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Semin & Cacioppo, 2009; Smith 
& Semin, 2007). In this sense, the “sort of attitude” suggested by Allport could be 
best understood as a tendency to incorporate contextual information in cognitive 
processing when others are present.
In this paper, we will focus on and test the idea that the presence of others trig-
gers the broadening of thought in order to incorporate contextual information in 
cognitive processing.
SOCIAL FACILITATION AND CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY 
Research has thoroughly demonstrated that mere presence contexts, such as the 
mere physical presence of others or non-competing co-action, can either improve 
or impair performance on tasks, an effect known as social facilitation (e.g., Guerin, 
1993; Zajonc, 1965). A myriad of studies show that performance on tasks like turn-
ing fishing reels (Triplett, 1898), driving (e.g., Yinon & Levian, 1995), or impression 
formation (Thomas, Skitka, Christen & Jurgena, 2002) can be affected by the mere 
presence of others.
One of the first empirical studies of this phenomenon (Allport, 1920, Experi-
ment two) suggested that this passive presence of others (PPO) influences access 
to information available in memory. When asking participants to write as many 
associations to a cue as possible, Allport verified that participants produced more 
associations in the presence of a co-actor (i.e., another individual doing the same 
task). Overall, as Allport attested, these associations were more “suggested by the 
immediate surroundings” (i.e., more context-related). Conversely, individuals in 
isolation produced fewer associations, and these associations were more “suggest-
ed by the stimulus word.” Allport’s original interpretation of this data was that the 
presence of others both energizes performance and increases the tendency for indivi-
duals to be taken “out of themselves.” Perhaps because of the appealing nature of this 
“energizing” interpretation, Allport’s additional reference to context sensitivity 
has largely been ignored. In fact, research in social facilitation has mainly focused 
on the contrast between “energizing” (motivational) and “capacity” (cognitive) 
explanations (e.g., Baron, 1986; Zajonc, 1965, but see Lambert et al., 2003) and has 
disregarded this specific feature of the data that calls our attention to how the pres-
ence of others changes the relevance of the context. Here, we want to revisit this 
social presence-driven context sensitivity within a situated cognition approach.
In Allport’s view, sensitivity to context means that: a) an environment of active 
persons is more likely to interfere with one’s train of thought than an environ-
ment of mere space and furniture; and that b) the presence of others increases the 
tendency to direct one’s thoughts toward stimuli outside of the self, including the 
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actual presence of others. In this sense, presence of others is expected to situate 
cognition in our actual context, having a functional purpose of making us more 
prone to what is socially relevant in a situation outside of ourselves.
Thus, it may be possible that social facilitation is a phenomenon that clearly 
translates the idea that human cognition is modulated by the social context, being 
an emergent property of the person–situation interaction (e.g., Semin & Cacioppo, 
2008; Smith & Semin, 2007). By assuming that the presence of others increases con-
text sensitivity, we are assuming that memory, perception, and judgment are af-
fected by situational characteristics (for reviews, see Barsalou, 2008; Greeno, 1994). 
A context sensitivity hypothesis can also be found in social facilitation research 
that shows that accompanied individuals have better recall for contextual aspects 
of the task situation (Sanders, Baron, & Moore, 1978) and make greater use of con-
textual cues when forming an impression of a target (Thomas et al., 2002). 
A FIRST APPROACH TO SOCIAL FACILITATION  
AS AN EFFECT OF CONTEXT SENSITIVITY 
In order to offer a first approach to explore Allport’s interpretation of social fa-
cilitation as related to context sensitivity and to do it within a situated cognition 
perspective, we designed two studies. These two studies offer a bridge between 
Allport’s work and more recent perspectives on how context is integrated into 
cognition.
Our first experiment replicates and improves Allport’s (1920) original study, 
adding information about associative commonality and overcoming some of its 
methodological flaws (see Guerrin, 1993). This associative commonality refers to 
the frequency with which a given associate of a word cue is activated in a popula-
tion in general and is retrieved by norms previously defined. Adding the associa-
tive-commonality measure is particularly relevant to infer spreading of thought 
because it maps the associate distance in a socially shared associative network 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). The greater the distance, the lower the commonality. 
Thus, this measure can help us clarify Allport’s results, suggesting that the pres-
ence of others changes individuals’ thinking by broadening their focus beyond 
stimuli-specific features.
Our second experiment directly tested the idea that by spreading our thoughts, 
the presence of others increases individuals’ attention to external context features, 
increasing context sensitivity. In this experiment, we aim to show that external 
context cues are likely to be incorporated into individuals’ judgments when they 
are in the presence of others.
EXPERIMENT 1
Here, we replicate Allport’s (1920) second experiment, by adding information 
about the mental representation that supports individuals’ performance. Namely, 
we added information about the network of associates that support individuals’ 
free association on a task.
In this way, we integrated Allport’s spreading-out-of-thought hypothesis with 
the spread-of-activation models (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975), 
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making specific assumptions about how the activation of the associative network 
is influenced by the presence of others. We expected the co-action group free as-
sociation task outputs to have: a) a higher number of associations, but b) be less 
stimulus-related and more context-related (based on Allport’s measure of “type-
of-associate”). Also, we expect (in addition to Allport’s work) these associates to 
be generally less common (more distantly represented in the network). By assum-
ing that a co-action condition activates less common associations, we assume that 
these individuals will access more distant information represented in the network.
In modifying Allport’s original study, we included a mere presence condition 
where we expected to replicate the effects observed with co-action. This general-
ization is sustained by all the literature that followed Allport’s work, suggesting 
that mere presence is the necessary condition for the presence effect to be observed 
(Zajonc, 1980). We expect no differences between the two presence conditions on 
the effects described above.
METHOD 
Participants and Design. Eighty-six ISPA (Instituto Superior de Psicologia Apli-
cada) undergraduate students (60 female; Mean age = 23.83; SD = 8.34) received 
credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to three levels 
of the social context manipulation (co-action vs. mere presence vs. isolation). 
Material and Procedure. Upon their arrival at the laboratory, participants were 
greeted and seated in front of an IBM computer. Participants were informed that 
the experiment concerned how people deal with paper/pencil and computer tasks 
simultaneously; they would therefore receive their instructions via computer, but 
their responses were to be done in paper/pencil format. Moreover, participants 
were told to use headphones that would signal with a beep when they were to 
begin and stop the task. The experimenter then instructed them to start the ex-
periment and left the room, leaving participants in one of three conditions defined 
by Guerin’s (1993) operationalization. In the co-action condition, participants per-
formed the task in the presence of other participants. In the mere presence condi-
tion, participants performed the task in the presence of a confederate who was 
reading a magazine. Finally, in the isolation condition, participants performed the 
task alone, without any human presence. In both presence conditions, participants 
were informed that their performance was anonymous and that the goal of the 
experiment was not to compare performance between participants, but rather to 
understand how people perform computer and paper/pencil tasks at the same 
time. This was done in order to rule out potential competition effects. For the par-
ticipants in the isolation condition, these instructions were not given.
On the computer, participants were presented with general instructions on how 
to perform the task. Modeled after Allport’s investigation (1920, Experiment two), 
participants were asked to put on the headphones and write down, for three min-
utes, all the words that came to mind when they read the word “Intelligent” (a 
word-cue for which associative commonality had been normalized; see Valchev, 
Garcia-Marques, & Ferreira, 2005).
After five minutes (performance duration pre-tested), the experimenter returned 
to the room, debriefed, and thanked participants. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Number of Associates. Planned analyses tested the hypothesis that co-action and 
mere presence conditions would generate a greater number of associations com-
pared to the isolation condition (+1; +1; -2). Results replicate Allport’s findings, 
suggesting that co-action (M = 14.52; SD = 4.95) and mere presence (M = 16.85; SD 
= 6.51) produced more associates than isolation (M = 11.98; SD = 5.33), t(83) = 2.82; 
p = .006, d = .62. Additional analysis showed no significant differences between 
the presence conditions (+1 co-action; -1 mere presence; isolation = 0), t(83) = 1.61; 
p = .11, d = .67; (1 - β) = .99.1 Type of Associate. Based on Allport’s (1920) typology, 
five independent judges categorize each associate (n = 654) as a: 1) cue-related 
associate (e.g., “bright”); 2) context-related associate (e.g., “classroom”); or 3) non-
related associate (e.g., “beans”). The inter-judgment coefficient of agreement was 
considerably high (K = .72), and distribution of responses for these categories was 
further analyzed.
To test the tendency for associations to spread throughout the cognitive system 
in the passive presence of others (PPO), we calculated the proportion of each type 
of associate for each condition and contrasted them directly on our hypotheses.2 
According to our rationale, we expected less cue-related associates (e.g., “smart”) 
and more context-related associates (e.g., “classroom”) in the PPO conditions than 
in isolation (Factor 1: mere presence = +1; co-action = +1; isolation = -2; Factor 2: cue-
related = -1; context-related = +1; non-related = 0). The results suggest that this interac-
tion is significant, t(83) = 3.187; p = .003, d = .70. Thus, these data seem to replicate 
the pattern obtained by Allport and generalize it to a mere presence condition (see 
Figure 1). Additionally, no differences emerged regarding the non-related associ-
ates between PPO and isolation (Mco-action = .26; SD = .04; Mmere presence = .34; 
SD = .04 vs. Misolation = .26; SD = .05, t<1), and no differences emerged between 
the two presence conditions on the three types of associates (t’s <1).
Because PPO conditions activated more associates in general, one could argue 
that the greater access to more context-related associates is a consequence of a more 
expanded network and that the use of relative frequencies is not a proper way to 
control for differences in the number of associates generated in each condition. 
To address this hypothesis, we ran the same analysis with absolute frequencies3 
as dependent measures and the number of associates as covariate (highly related 
with our dependent measure F(1,82) >2000; p = .000). Results demonstrated that 
the focused contrast is still significant, t(82) = 1.79; p = .03 (one-tailed), d = .40 and 
that the conditions did not differ in the number of non-related associates (t(82) <1). 
Together, these results suggest that the effect of the covariate accounts for some of 
the variance explained by the PPO, but it does not explain the effect by itself. 
1. Power was computed for the contrasts that revealed to be non-significant and t>1.
2. General analysis suggests a main effect of type of associate, F(1,166) = 4.64; p = .01. Participants 
produced more cue-related associates (M = .41, SD = .03), followed by context-related (M =.31, SD = 
.03) and non-related (M = .29, SD = .02). Moreover, the presence x type-of-associate interaction was 
also significant, F(4,166) = 3.51; p = .008).
3. The analysis that uses absolute frequencies with no covariate reveals the same effects observed 
with relative frequencies, being the first contrast t(83) = 2.09; p =.04, and the second one t(83) = 1.79; p 
=.08. This last marginal effect is associated with the fact that co-action increasing of responses is more 
clearly noticed in this type of responses (non-related associates). Results turned clear when number of 
associates is introduced as a co-variate.
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Associative Commonality. According to Deese (1962), one possible way to clas-
sify associations in terms of the relations among the responses to a stimulus is 
to “weigh the common associations by their frequency” (p. 164). To do so, we 
assigned each associate one of the four intervals of frequency4 of the Portuguese 
population norms (Valchev et al., 2005) for our target word. Then, we calculated the 
proportion of associates in each interval and multiplied it by its corresponding 
weight. Weights were as follows: 4 (for more common associates, i.e., associates 
with commonality above 5%); 3 (for associates with commonality between 5% and 
1%); 2 (for associates with commonality between 0.5% and 1%), and 1 (for less 
common associates, i.e., below 0.5%). Finally, we averaged these proportions and 
computed an index of commonality. According to our hypothesis, if the presence 
conditions promote a greater spread of activation, then these individuals will ex-
hibit lower values on this commonality index.
Planned contrast analyses (co-action = -1; mere presence = -1; isolation = +2) 
revealed a significant effect t(83) = 2.47; p = .02, d = .54. As predicted, the presence 
conditions had a significantly lower commonality index than the isolation condi-
tion (Mco-action = .33; SD = .09; Mmere presence = .29; SD = .10 vs. Misolation = .38; 
SD = .11). No significant differences emerged between the two presence condi-
tions, t(83) = 1.47; p =.16, d = .32; (1 - β) = .74.
To show that this was not a mere artifact of the increased number of associ-
ates generated in PPO, we ran the same analysis with the number of responses as 
a covariate. As expected, the covariate is highly associated with our dependent 
measure, F(1,82) = 4.68; p = .03, d = .48. The relevant planned contrast performed to 
test our assumptions lost some strength when we controlled for the number of as-
sociates generated by each participant, but more importantly, it remained signifi-
4. In this way, we rank commonalities controlling for differences in variability within each interval 
between different conditions.
FIGURE 1. Performance in terms of types of associates as a function of the presence conditions. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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cant, t(83) = 1.77; p = .05 (one-tailed), d = .39. So, these results seem to suggest that 
although the number of associates in PPO is related to the access of less common 
associations, it does not guarantee this by itself. Thus, we interpreted these results 
to be consistent with Allport’s findings, suggesting that PPO increases “spreading-
out-of-thoughts.”
One possible caveat to this interpretation may be that the instructions given to 
participants in PPO conditions could have boosted creative thought. By inform-
ing participants in the co-action condition that our aim was “not to compare per-
formance,” we could have promoted less normative and more idiosyncratic re-
sponses in that condition. If that was the case, this could explain the main effect 
of presence of others in the number of associates. However, we see no reason to 
assume that our instructions could also explain its moderations by “type of associ-
ates.” If our instructions primed PPO participants with creativity and assuming 
that non-related are more idiosyncratic hence more creative, shouldn’t we expect 
the number of non-related associates to be higher in these conditions than in isola-
tion? Evidence that the number of these associates is equal in presence and isola-
tion conditions seems to disprove this hypothesis.
That said we assume that these data not only replicate Allport’s findings, but 
also clearly suggest the plausibility of the idea that presence of others prompts 
our cognitive system to work in a more expanded network. In other words, the 
passive presence of another person will make cognitive processing more perme-
able to the integration of information less related to the focal stimulus. Thus, we 
hypothesize that in the presence of others, our mind is cued to perceive an item 
within its context. If this is true, we could also expect that in the presence of oth-
ers, general context features will be more available to individuals, making their 
responses more sensitive to them. The next experiment aims to test this hypothesis 
focusing on external context features.
EXPERIMENT 2
Research has shown that individuals differ in how sensitive they are to context 
cues in their information processing. When processing information, field-indepen-
dent individuals have been shown to rely on an internal frame of reference, while 
field-dependent individuals rely on an external frame of reference (Goodenough, 
1976), pay greater attention to contextual information (Witkin, Goodenough & Olt-
man, 1979), are more receptive to social cues (Thomas & Griffin, 1983), and are 
more sensitive to relationships between objects and the field (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, 
& Norenzayan, 2001).
Among the paradigms utilized to show this effect, Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamu-
ra, and Larsen (2003) developed a paradigm that offers a helpful test for the as-
sumption we wanted to test in our investigation. The Framed-Line Test paradigm 
was developed to test the assumption that North Americans are more field in-
dependent compared to their Asian counterparts. In this task, individuals were 
presented with a square frame within which a vertical line extended downward 
from the center of the upper edge of the square. Then, individuals were presented 
with an empty square frame and asked to draw a line identical to the first line 
in either absolute length (absolute task) or proportional to the height of the sur-
rounding frame (relative task). In the absolute task, individuals had to ignore both 
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the first frame (when assessing the length of the line) and the second frame (when 
reproducing the line). In the relative task, the participants needed to incorporate 
the height information of the surrounding frame in both encoding and reproduc-
ing the line. Kitayama and colleagues’ results showed that North Americans, who 
were expected to be more field independent, performed better on the absolute 
task (that required ignoring both the first and the second frame) than Asians. Con-
versely, Asians, who were expected to be more field dependent, performed better 
on the relative task (that required the incorporation of the height information).
Note that the frame of the line in this task is the context, relevant to good perfor-
mance on the relative task and irrelevant to the performance on the absolute task. 
Taking into account the results we obtained in Experiment 1 (and that no differ-
ences were found regarding non-related associates), we should expect a context 
relevant to the task to be more susceptible to the influence of PPO.
Thus, in our second experiment, the use of the Framed-Line Test allows us to di-
rectly test our assumption that the presence of others increases “field dependence” 
when the field is task-related. We expect that individuals in the PPO will perform 
the relative task more accurately when they have to incorporate the height infor-
mation of the surrounding frame in both encoding and reproducing the line.
METHOD 
Design and Participants. Thirty-one ISPA undergraduate students (20 female; 
Mean age = 22.51; SD = 7.34) received credit for their participation. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (co-action vs. isolation) x 2 (absolute vs. relative 
task) x 5 (stimulus version: the five combinations of frames and line) mixed de-
sign, in which task and version were within-subjects variables and presence was a 
between-subjects factor.
Material and Procedure. A replication of the Framed-Line Test paradigm devel-
oped by Kitayama and colleagues (2003) was used to test our hypothesis. Each 
participant was asked to draw a line in either an absolute or relative version of the 
task. To avoid the potential priming effects of the creative thought of Experiment 
1, both groups received the same instructions, and no reference to performance 
comparison or anonymity was made.
In the absolute task, participants were instructed to draw a line that was the 
same absolute length as the line in the first frame. In the relative task, participants 
were instructed to draw a line whose proportion to the size of the second frame 
was the same as the proportion of the first line to the size of the first frame. Before 
the experiment began, concrete examples were given to make sure participants 
understood how to perform the task. The type of task was counterbalanced for all 
participants.
The same five combinations used by Kitayama and colleagues (2003) of the rela-
tive sizes of the two frames and the line in the first frame were constructed. Similar 
to the original experiment, we created two combinations in which the first frame 
was larger than the second, and two other combinations in which the first frame 
was smaller than the second. In half of these cases, the first line was longer than 
one half the height of the first square. In the remaining half, the first line was 
shorter than half the height of the first square. In the fifth combination, the first 
and the second frames had the same size.
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To avoid iconic memory effects, we presented the first frame for 5 seconds on the 
computer screen and the second frame in paper format, where the correspondent 
second frame was printed. Participants received specific instructions for each task 
(“draw a proportional line” vs. “draw an equal line”) right before they performed 
it. The five combinations were presented in a random order and the same stimuli 
were used for both the relative and the absolute tasks.
Like in Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to a condition in 
which they performed the task either in the presence of co-actors or alone in the 
room. In either case, the experimenter was not in the room.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Performance accuracy in both tasks was assessed by measuring the lines drawn 
by the participants and calculating the absolute and relative differences between 
these lengths and the correct lengths. As in Experiment 1, since our hypothesis 
was directly translated in the effects associated with the general ANOVA model, 
we used it to test them. The mean error scores were then entered in an ANOVA 
with the presence vs. isolation conditions as between-subjects variables and type 
of task (absolute vs. relative) as within-subject factors.5
Results revealed the expected significant interaction between the type of task 
and the presence condition, F(1,29) = 7.97; p = .009, d = 1.05 (see Figure 2). Whereas 
for the relative task, participants in co-action outperformed participants in the iso-
lation condition (Mco-action = -.08, SD =.18 vs. Malone = .59, SD =.19; t(29) = 2.62; 
p = .001; d = .97), as we expected, a different pattern characterized performance 
in the absolute task. When the context was not relevant to the absolute task, PPO 
participants seemed to be less influenced by it. That is, the data suggests that there 
was no reliable difference between individuals in isolation and in co-action re-
garding performance on the absolute task (Malone = .49, SD = .27 vs. Mco-action = 
.85, SD = .24, t(29) = 1.02; p = .32; d = .38; (1 - β) = .30).6 Further results also revealed 
a main effect of type of task, F(1,29) = 4.98; p = .03, d = .82, suggesting that, overall, 
participants performed the relative task better (M = .26, SD =.14) than the absolute 
task (M = .67, SD =.18).
As expected, these results suggest that accompanied individuals were more ac-
curate when they had to incorporate contextual information on judgments about 
a focal stimulus. However, when the contextual information is not relevant, both 
conditions are influenced equally by it.
This evidence corroborates our idea that the presence of others increases rele-
vant context sensitivity. When others are present, our cognitive processes are more 
influenced by the situation or context, even when the stimuli are abstract rather 
than social.
5. The same analysis having the stimulus version (the five combinations of frames and line) as 
within-subject variables showed that the focused effects did not depend on the stimulus version 
(F<1), which means that the error spread equally across the five combinations (even when the two 
frames had the same size). Similarly, the results were not affected by the order of the task (F<1). 
6. The reduced level of power of this analysis may suggest that although not relevant to the task 
context is less prone to influence individuals judgments in PPO, context sensitivity may open it to 
some levels of bias.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our experiments replicate and extend Allport’s idea that in the presence of others, 
we tend to spread our thoughts, making indirect and contextual information more 
available in our minds. Besides replicating and extending Allport’s data, we clear-
ly showed that the presence of others increases how individuals integrate internal 
context features (activate more distant nodes of their mental representation) and 
external context features (frames of the lines to be judged) into their thoughts. In 
this way, this investigation supports our claim that in the PPO, individuals broad-
en their thinking and integrate more context features into their thoughts.
Our context-sensitivity hypothesis is not anchored in an assumption that indi-
viduals in the presence of others are necessarily more biased by undesirable and 
irrelevant context cues. On the contrary, data from Experiment 1 suggest that par-
ticipants in the presence of others and in the isolation condition did not differ in 
their responses to “non-related associates.” In Experiment 2, the tendency is the 
same; participants in the presence of others do not seem to be more biased by irrel-
evant contextual information than participants alone. It is worthwhile, however, to 
note that if an increase in statistical power detected some differences between con-
ditions in the absolute task, that would suggest that the increased context sensitiv-
ity associated with the PPO would also suggest less accuracy, hence, more bias. 
What our findings suggest is that participants seem to differ in the degree to which 
they attend to less focal yet task-relevant context features (although possible, it is 
less likely that an increased sensitivity to context in PPO also biases judgment).
We have interpreted the results of Experiment 1, suggesting that PPO’s decreased 
commonality is related to an increased sensitivity to the context of the concept 
that was primed. However, the decreased commonality may also be understood 
as increasing idiosyncratic responses. Although this could call into question our 
FIGURE 2. Performance on both versions of the Frame Line Test as a function of the presence 
condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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idea that PPO makes our cognition more situated, we believe that this is not the 
case. First, because decreased commonality derives from the activation of both less 
directly related associates and non-related associates being only the latter truly id-
iosyncratic (because they are scarcely socially shared). Second, because no effects 
emerged regarding these non-related associates across conditions in Experiment 1. 
Differences were observed in the  increase of less direct associates.
It should be stressed that Matlin and Zajonc (1968) report what apparently seem 
to be contradictory results, given that they report an increase of more common 
responses in PPO. However, the methodological differences between our experi-
ments and theirs seem to be highly relevant. First, Matlin and Zajonc’s task re-
quires only one first association—that is, participants are only asked to give one 
associate for each presented word, not allowing them to navigate in their internal 
representation network, which was the aim to test our hypothesis. Second, their 
experimental conditions were not purely social or alone, employing a within-
factor design and finding effects only in the alone condition. Third, their com-
monality score, instead of being reported as norms, was reported as the frequency 
the word had in the sample of responses generated. Their uniqueness measure 
was calculated based on whether the word was or was not present in Palermo-
Jenkins’ norms. It is not possible to infer context sensitivity from these data given 
their methodology. Corroborating our analysis, Blank (Blank, 1980; Blank, Staff, & 
Shaver, 1976) showed that even though participants in the PPO give more com-
mon responses, this happens because they tend to suppress unique/idiosyncratic 
responses and not because they have stronger unique links to more strongly as-
sociated information. Thus, although we recognize the interest in exploring and 
contrast these experiments with our Experiment 1, studies such as these do not 
inform our context sensitivity hypothesis.
A more relevant question to our approach looks at the way we define “context.” 
In Experiment 1, we refer to “context” as the nodes that are more distant but are 
incorporated in the same associative network. In Experiment 2, we refer to the line 
frame that needs to be attended to in order to perform the task as the context of the 
focal stimulus. It could be argued that the network is the definition of the concept 
itself and that the frame is part of the problem and so it is as important as the line 
to be evaluated. If that is the case, we can assume that instead of increasing context 
sensitivity, what PPO does is to focus individuals on the task itself. This interpreta-
tion is congruent with the one used to explain why PPO reduces Stroop interfer-
ence. The explanation has been that PPO increases stimulus-relevant processing 
at the expense of peripheral (i.e., contextual-related) processing (Dumas, Huguet, 
Monteil, & Ayme, 2005; Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999). This explana-
tion seems intriguing in light of our results, since this explanation cannot explain 
our findings for both studies. This offers an interesting topic to pursue in future 
research. Why don’t PPO’s participants reduce the number of non-related associ-
ates relative to those in the isolation condition in Experiment 1, and why do they 
not perform better than those in isolation in the absolute tasks in Experiment 2?
One possible reason why Stroop experiments offer apparently contradicting 
results from the ones reported in this paper may be that accompanied individu-
als (cueing context sensitivity) are simultaneously also more focused on the focal 
stimulus and aware of contextual aspects of the situation. This idea may be cor-
roborated by some of Klauer, Herfordt, & Voss’s (2008) findings associated with 
the PPO’s impact on Stroop effects. Klauer and colleagues suggested that the re-
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sults of both Huguet and colleagues and Dumas colleagues could be explained 
because a dual-task situation was used (i.e., in those experiments, participants 
had to form an impression of the Stroop task while performing it). According to 
Klauer and colleagues, PPO can influence performance at a task-selection level, 
rather than at the stimulus level. In support of this, Klauer and colleagues found 
the Stroop reduction only when individuals performed two tasks simultaneously, 
but not one at a time. These results may suggest that the presence of others influ-
ences how much individuals attend to the duality imposed by the context. Thus, 
the possibility that others may act as a conjoint cue together with the stimulus for 
the activation of the context features is an empirical question that future research 
should help to clarify.
Social facilitation effects have been classically explained by motivational fac-
tors (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Zajonc, 
1965). Hence, one has to consider the possibility that our effects can be explained 
by the fact that those in the isolation condition are less motivated to perform the 
task. Consequently, they would be less willing to “explore” the situation and thus 
extend their attention to the context. If motivational differences could explain why 
PPO increases the production of associates, these differences are not able to ac-
count for the other results (e.g., the differences in the type of associates). Addition-
al assumptions should be made to explain why motivational differences would 
change accuracy in contextual-embedded judgments (Experiment 2).
We believe that our hypothesis suggests a different and nuanced way of inter-
preting how PPO impacts judgments and behaviors: it increases context sensitiv-
ity. The question that follows these results is why PPO increases context sensitiv-
ity. One possible explanation may lie in the assumption that others may act as 
primes, cueing our memory system to activate more socially related information 
(and thus more diverse information). A caveat of this hypothesis is that it assumes 
spread-of-thought to be restricted to a specific context—the one related to social 
cues (Thomas et al., 2002). However, our experiments suggest that PPO effects 
are not restricted to the integration of contextual features that are social per se. 
Another possibility is the assumption that PPO directs individuals’ attention to 
information that is not self-related. Congruent with this view, some approaches to 
social facilitation (e.g., Sanders, 1981) have shown that PPO increases attention to 
situational features. However, PPO has also been shown to increase self-attention 
(Bond, 1982), and our studies have furnished evidence of increased sensitivity 
only relevant to the task context. A more pure situational perspective would as-
sume that the task to be performed is perceived differently in PPO than in isola-
tion because our cognitive activity integrates the environmental situation that we 
are in. By doing that, several differences occur that are not explained by specific 
cognitive or specific motivational processes but rather by adaptive processes. The 
cognitive system adapts to whatever context it is in. As such, the presence of oth-
ers, like variables such as culture, seems to promote differences in the way we deal 
with the situation.
We believe that the effects presented here indirectly furnish the first functional 
approach to the social facilitation effect, which assumes that our cognitive system 
is attuned to the social context in order to adapt individuals to their environment.
We are aware that many more questions can be raised and criticisms made to our 
set of experiments, especially given the extension of data regarding social facilita-
tion effects. There is extensive work to be done in order to explore our claim. The 
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goal of this paper is to show that there is evidence worthy of further exploration 
into an innovative idea that reconciles the oldest topic in social psychology with 
new conceptions of human behavior and thinking—the idea that even basic social 
contexts, such as the mere presence of others, are sufficient in making our cogni-
tion more situated.
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